NASU, H. September This article explores the relationship between political trust and energy pipelines connecting Russia and the European Union EU. It seeks to explain low levels of trust in the EU—Russia energy relationship, varying levels of energy cooperation and trust within the EU toward Russia, and whether the EU—Russia energy relationship is representative of vulnerabilities shared by producers and consumers in other contexts.
Rationalist approaches that focus on interests and reciprocity are incomplete and should be supplemented by a concept of trust based on normative factors. This article finds that political disputes with transit and consumer states, competing norms, and the legacy of mistrust from the Cold War especially among certain East European countries combined to form a uniquely toxic relationship.
Despite production boom, U. Azerbaijan is to suspend cooperation with U.
Abstract in English : "Energy Security topic needs a detailed and systematic conceptual consideration, joining every functional aspects which converge in that expression. Until today, it has been used a classic vision, focused in infrastructures and geopolitics of supply. Thereafter, a new doctrine has been performing about Energy Security, which considers this in an integrated and multi-dimensional way, highlighting functional elements over territorial one. Regarding the Energy Security in the Defence Forces, it needs a specific military view, which does not deny its compatibility and sinergies which the civil energy system.
The Energy Security concept is common to state and corporate fields, and it increases protection, reliability and capability of reaction, generating better economic and business results. The Weakest Link? February January In a context of competitive polemology among the companies placed inside the market, corporate counter-intelligence appears as the activity aimed to deny the knowledge about our own issues which an aposing corporate intelligence organ tryes to take away, confronting actions generated from the competitive intelligence function runned by foe entities.
Energy sector is vital and energy security is one of the key national security dimensions. Therefore, ensuring this embraces granting the continuity of energy supplies, protection of critical infrastructures and logistic routes, energy generation, transport, storage and distribution facilities, industry and techology secrets, market ordinations, ownership of strategic companies and stability of pricing, as far as considering any kind of economic or not security spheres which are inter-linked to them.
Corporate counter-intelligence in energy sector shoule be performed as a tool for enterprise protection in order to meet above-mentioned needs of protection against risks, vulnerabilities, threats and attacks, integrating all the energy security matters and adjusting its methods of management of knowledge and uncertainty to its particular characteristics. Despite an array of concerns on the part of its 28 member states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is gradually moving towards greater involvement in energy security issues. Real world events as well as the interests of some of NATO's partner countries have been important drivers in this regard.
The challenge for the alliance will be to develop a practical agenda in energy security which plays to NATO's strengths, yet, without unduly militarising the issue nor duplicating efforts by other actors. This study explores how Asian energy security issues are perceived in China, India, and Japan. It investigates perceptions of 16 energy security challenges drawn from an extensive survey, as well as how such conceptions differ between Asian energy consumers and across these dimensions of energy security.
Oktober During the past decade, concerns about energy security have reached levels not witnessed in the developed democracies since the s and early s. In good part because of such concerns, each of the largest of these countries — Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States — has conducted a major review of energy policy, initiated significant policy changes, or both. Also like the s, recent years have seen a variety of proposals for international cooperation to promote energy security.
This is where the similarities with the past largely end, however. In contrast to the earlier period, when the principal sources of concern in these countries were high oil prices and uncertain oil supplies, recent worries about energy security have been much more diverse. This paper describes these differences and explores their implications. It argues that the disparities in today's energy security concerns and policy preferences in the major developed democracies are due in part to the divergent policies pursued in response to the oil shocks of the s.
It also argues that the present differences will make meaningful cooperation by these countries to promote energy security, which was never easy in the past, yet more difficult. Food and Energy Security open access journal. November US energy: What's oil production got to do with national security? Energy Independence For U. World Oil Transit Checkpoints U. Ukraine and Russia: political flavor of the gas war BlogActiv. DALY, J. Back to the Future of U. Energy for Tomorrow TU, K. April Commission learns lessons from gas platform flare Euractiv. Russia's oil and gas export strategies Euractiv.
Ukraine plans to break Gazprom's monopoly Euractiv. Gas discovery gives Romania prospect of full energy independence Euractiv. COM 14 February Department of Defense, News Release 13 January Big oil and gas finds in northern Europe EurActiv. Russia, Ukraine arm-wrestling over pipelines EurActiv. Can China sate its thirst for energy? Iran threatens U. Iran Warns U. October CHEN, S. July A subterranean revolution? Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania.
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Spiegel Online International. Tags: energy security , environmental security , geopolitics , high north , new strategic concept. However, the picture has recently become more nuanced, as each side has started to combine its traditional power approach to energy with different strategies, and sometimes simultaneously deployed different types of power. Particularly after the Ukraine crisis, the EU has deviated from the liberal market model and taken a geopolitical approach to external energy policy by intensifying its efforts to diversify imports away from Russia.
Some of the new EU-sponsored energy projects, such as the Southern Gas Corridor, appear to be driven by geopolitical considerations Siddi c. As will be argued in the essay, this approach has had modest results, and the EU has proven more effective as a regulatory rather than geopolitical power. The historical and economic significance of the EU—Russia energy relationship Energy trade is an essential economic driver of EU—Russia relations. Russia is the main supplier of oil, gas and coal to the EU, as well as one of its main providers of uranium.
Gas and oil trade has been a key feature of relations between Soviet Russia and several European countries for nearly five decades.
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The East—West gas trade continued to grow after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Given the declining domestic production of fossil fuels and the phasing out of nuclear power in some member states, notably Germany, oil and gas import dependency is expected to grow in the coming decades. Despite its lesser economic role in the broader EU—Russia energy relationship, the gas trade has been the main source of controversy and the most politicised topic. This is due to the fact that EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe CEE —most notably Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Slovakia—have relied heavily on Russian gas because they lack the infrastructure to import gas from other producers.
Most EU member states in CEE have few or no alternatives to Russian gas in the sectors where it is used, primarily household heating. The bulk of Russian gas exports to the EU is directed to Western European countries Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom , which have a diversified portfolio of suppliers, are better interconnected with global gas markets and—due to long-standing cooperation—place more trust in energy trade with Russia than CEE countries.
Hence, from the perspective of the larger EU importers of Russian gas, gas trade with Russia does not pose serious energy security or political problems Yafimava , pp. Nonetheless, fears about possible disruptions in energy trade with Russia have increased since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, most notably with respect to natural gas Dickel et al. Moscow and Brussels have been vying for influence in their shared neighbourhood, establishing a competition that has had repercussions for energy trade.
In the pursuit of its political goals in the post-Soviet space, Russia has often used its vast energy resources to exert geopolitical power, notably by adjusting energy prices based on political relations with the importing state Proedrou , pp. Having a large market but lacking fossil fuels, the EU has attempted to achieve its commercial and political aims mostly through regulatory power. Arguably, the main issues in EU—Russia gas trade in the s have been related to the exercise of these two types of power.
This definition is linked to the fact that most Western countries do not have sufficient indigenous energy resources to sustain their economies and societies and therefore have to import energy from abroad, hence their focus on the security of supply. As noted earlier, the EU is one of the largest energy importing blocs in the international arena. Its demand for external energy supplies is so large that its market is among the most coveted by energy producers.
For countries such as Russia, security of demand can be achieved primarily through long-term sale contracts, with prices that guarantee revenues over an extended period and cover the costs of building and maintaining the necessary infrastructure. In this context, the state tends to see energy resources, production and transport infrastructure as strategic assets that should be brought under its control or close supervision, given their importance for national welfare overall Kuzemko , pp.
In the last decade, different understandings of energy security in the EU and Russia have had a negative effect on their gas partnership. Until the mids, it appeared that these differences could be reconciled: energy prices kept increasing and EU companies were keen to sign long-term contracts with Gazprom, which were perceived as guaranteeing the security of supply in the long run at relatively acceptable prices Belyi , p.
Moreover, the EU expected Russia to accept market liberal economic rules in energy trade, notably those enshrined in the Energy Charter Treaty ECT , and apply them to its own energy market Kuzemko , pp. However, in Russia announced that it would not become a contracting party to the treaty Mironova Furthermore, in the late s the global economic crisis and the shale revolution in the United States drove energy prices downwards.
Cheap gas became available on spot markets in Europe, leading European importers to seek a renegotiation of long-term contracts with Gazprom. While these contracts remained in force, prices and take-or-pay clauses were renegotiated on terms more favourable to importers, implying a loss of revenues for Gazprom and uncertainty over the future extension of the contracts Belyi , pp. In addition to divergences over regulatory frameworks and commercial interests, the development of clashing foreign policy agendas negatively affected EU—Russia gas trade. As Ukraine was highly dependent on Russian gas supplies and a key transit country for the EU—Russia gas trade, energy became part of the contention.
Energy geopolitics concerns the access, supply and transit of energy resources Kropatcheva , p. Thanks to its large, state-controlled natural endowments, Russia tends to act as a geopolitical actor in its post-Soviet neighbourhood. The Russian leadership claims to have essential foreign policy interests in this region Trenin , and the control of energy supplies and routes is key to their achievement. For instance, the EU compensated for the reduction of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine in — through reverse flows, that is, by rerouting its gas supplies towards Ukraine.
Moreover, the EU has supported geopolitically motivated pipeline projects that would allow it to bypass Russia and import gas from other producers in the Caspian region, such as the Nabucco pipeline Sierra and the Southern Gas Corridor Siddi c. Both these pipeline projects and reverse flows to Ukraine are examples of how the EU has adjusted its energy policy in accordance to the broader foreign policy and geopolitical goal of countering Russian influence and power. In the energy domain, however, EU institutions have primarily deployed regulatory power, that is, the use of tailored legislation to manage relationships with large external energy providers.
At the same time, it is important to note that regulatory power can also be used to advance geopolitical goals. As argued below, Russia attempted to deploy regulatory power on its own terms. Russian gas is an important component of the energy mix of both the EU and Ukraine. Russian gas is transported to the EU and Ukraine via pipelines. There are three main routes: the Ukrainian pipeline network, built during the Cold War; the Yamal—Europe pipeline via Belarus and Poland, built in the s; and the Nord Stream pipeline, inaugurated in and providing a direct link between Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea.
Until the mids, Russian gas flowed to the EU without major disruptions. While Ukraine had previously benefitted from discounts on Russian gas, a Soviet-era legacy, Gazprom started to demand higher prices, which remained nevertheless lower than those it charged in Western European markets Yafimava , p.
Geopolitics & Energy Security
In and , price disagreements between Moscow and Kyiv resulted in disruptions of gas flow towards Europe, seriously affecting the economy and society of several Eastern and Southern European countries Pirani et al. In other words, Russia deployed its geopolitical power by interrupting energy supplies to Ukraine when Kyiv adopted a foreign policy stance unfavourable to Russia and refused to accept upward adjustments of the price of Russian gas.
Ukraine responded by exerting geopolitical power on its own terms, using its leverage as a transit country to disrupt Russian gas exports to the EU.
By diverting transiting Russian gas bound for the EU and using it for domestic consumption, Ukraine 9 In addition, Finland and the Baltic states have their own direct pipeline connections to Russia. Volumes of gas via Ukraine include those exported to Turkey and other non-EU countries in the Balkans. In particular, Kyiv used its strategic position and transit infrastructure to disrupt the EU—Russia gas trade, involve the EU in the crisis and thus put pressure on Gazprom to lower its prices Pirani et al.
Russia continued to deploy geopolitical power in its energy relationship with Ukraine in the following years. In it granted a discount on the price of gas to Kyiv that was linked to the extension of the lease of the Sevastopol naval base to the Russian fleet Pirani , pp. However, the discount was revoked in , when the Euromaidan protests brought to power a government that was hostile to Russian interests.
- Die Windsors?
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- Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus : The European Union, Russia and Turkey.
- Ordinary Differential Equations.
In and , the political confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv had repercussions for Russian—Ukrainian energy relations. However, contrary to what happened during the gas crises of and , the flow of Russian gas to the EU through Ukraine was not significantly affected. The EU mediated a deal and provided financial guarantees for the resumption of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine both in autumn and autumn Stulberg Russia agreed to the deal also in order to preserve its lucrative energy trade with the EU.
In other words, in the energy relationship with the EU, Russian actors have largely followed the logic of trade, and economic interests have not been subordinated to the increasingly tense geopolitical confrontation Siddi d. In another articulation of its geopolitical power aimed primarily at Ukraine, Russia has increasingly reoriented its gas exports to the EU towards the Nord Stream route and the Belarusian transit corridor, away from Ukraine see Table 2.
As Table 2 shows, the reorientation of Russian gas exports started before the Ukraine crisis. Between and , the volumes of gas shipped through Nord Stream grew considerably, while volumes transiting Ukraine decreased. By reorienting its gas exports, Russia is pursuing both economic and foreign policy goals. The age and high maintenance costs of the Ukrainian pipelines, which were built in Soviet times, reduce the economic and security rationale for continued reliance on them. However, phasing out the Ukrainian gas transit system will only be possible if new routes become available.
Pipeline projects as manifestation of geopolitical power As of early , Gazprom is working on two alternative projects to Ukrainian gas transit: the Nord Stream-2 and the Turkish Stream pipelines Siddi a. Both projects highlight how Russian external energy policy combines the pursuit of commercial objectives with foreign policy goals.
For the Russian state, they provide a guarantee that income from gas sales will not be disrupted in the event of new disputes with Ukraine. From the Greek—Turkish border, European member states are expected to build and manage additional infrastructure Tagliapietra The pipeline will also allow Russia to end its dependence on Ukrainian transit for gas exports to Turkey. If built in its entirety, Turkish Stream will have a total capacity of However, the full implementation of the project is particularly dependent on the continuation of good relations between Russia and Turkey Demiryol Between November and the summer of , work on Turkish Stream was halted due to tensions between Moscow and Ankara over the Syrian crisis, after Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian bomber close to the Turkish—Syrian border.
The incident reflects a key weakness of geopolitical power in energy policy. Like Turkish Stream, Nord Stream-2 reflects a combination of political and commercial objectives: bypass Ukraine, counter the competition of other gas exporters, secure Russian gas supplies to the EU and particularly to Germany, the main importer of Russian gas. Nord Stream-2 also enjoys the support of several European companies and governments, particularly Germany, while it faces opposition from other EU member states, notably Poland and the Baltic states Fischer The pipeline will allow Gazprom to intensify its commercial partnership with European companies17 and enable the Russian state to revitalise its long-standing cooperative relationship with Germany Siddi b.
On the other hand, European institutions could use their regulatory power to thwart the pipeline if legal issues are identified. This has prevented the use of Nord Stream at full capacity. It remains unclear whether similar or other legal hurdles will affect the Nord Stream-2 project.
Separating regulation from politics is particularly difficult because the Commission pursues a political agenda in parallel to its role as regulator of the energy market. For these reasons, the Commission has been sceptical of Russian plans for new pipelines bypassing Ukraine.
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However, their role in the project remains unclear due to legal challenges brought forward by Poland, which forced them to withdraw from the joint venture in late Gotev The SGC highlights how the EU has attempted to exert its own geopolitical power by seeking alternative energy suppliers and providing political backing to energy projects Sierra ; Kuzemko , p. The Union has tried to gain access to Central Asian gas resources and build a transportation route that bypasses Russia. These proposals and projects represent a tentative shift away from the regulatory and market approach towards a more strategic and geopolitical agenda.
The results of this strategy have been modest thus far. The rationale of this policy is that, if regulations and interconnections open up national gas markets, external suppliers will have to compete for a share in the lucrative EU market, which will lead them to reduce prices. For this reason, in the EU adopted a set of directives and regulations, cumulatively referred to as Third Energy Package, which aims at the liberalisation and integration of national gas markets. The business strategy of Gazprom includes both the extraction of gas and its shipment to markets via pipelines in which the company holds a majority stake.
As this strategy conflicts with the legislation of the Third Energy Package, Gazprom has sought exemptions from the relevant EU rules. However, EU regulatory power ultimately proved an insurmountable obstacle for the Gazprom-led South Stream project.
Between and , Russia signed intergovernmental agreements with the countries that were meant to host South Stream infrastructure: Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, Croatia, Austria and Slovenia. In December the European Commission decreed that the agreements had to be renegotiated because they were in breach of EU law, in particular, the provisions preventing energy producers from simultaneously owning energy transmission networks.
The European Commission is tasked with monitoring the correct application of EU competition rules and has a wide range of inspection and enforcement powers, such as investigating businesses, holding hearings and granting exemptions. The investigation against Gazprom was formally launched in September , when the Russian company was suspected of breaching the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, specifically Article concerning the restriction or distortion of competition and Article on the abuse of dominant market position. The Russian company was suspected of three anti-competitive practices Sharples First, it was accused of hindering cross-border gas sales within the EU by imposing destination clauses in its contracts with some energy companies.
Destination clauses require the purchased gas to be used in a specific territory, thereby preventing the re-export of imported gas. The second anti-competitive practice concerned unfair pricing. In the late s, as the price of oil remained higher than spot prices of gas in the European market, Western European companies were able to negotiate discounts with Gazprom. Doing this proved more difficult for CEE EU member states, which lacked the infrastructure to import cheaper gas from other sources. Thirdly, the Commission suspected that Gazprom made the supply of gas to Bulgaria and Poland conditional on obtaining concessions regarding pipeline projects.
In late September , Gazprom proposed formal talks with the Commission to settle the case. On the contrary, it attempted to challenge the EU in the regulatory field. In particular, Russia objected to the requirement to grant access to natural gas and electricity networks to different operators, which forced Gazprom to cede infrastructure and market shares. While it stated that the main principles of the Third Energy Package are lawful, it also argued that some aspects of EU energy policy most notably the Trans-European Networks for Energy Strategy discriminated against Russian gas and were thus inconsistent with WTO law.